Given that exact sciences and phenomenology belong to fundamentally different classes of eidetic science (158/169), it would be unfruitful to even try to ground or conduct phenomenology analogously to the way exact sciences are grounded and conducted. Because phenomenology is a descriptive science, it deals exclusively with ‘morphological essences’, which, at best, asymptotically approach the ideal essences of the exact sciences which are akin to “ideas in the Kantian sense” (Hua ɪɪɪ/1: 155/166). These basic principles were present and discernible already in the Logical Investigations and remained operational throughout Husserl’s career, but they find their standard and explicit expression in Ideas ɪ most famously, of course, in §24, but also, e.g., in §§74–75, where Husserl aims to differentiate between different classes of eidetic sciences, contrasting the descriptive procedure of transcendental phenomenology with the functioning of exact sciences, of which mathematics, and geometry in particular, is Husserl’s go-to example. This tension is especially noticeable in the context of the question regarding absolute beginnings in phenomenology, i.e., the question of its speculative dimension, and its place within Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. For these reasons, Husserl’s relation to Fink’s interventions into his own work was significantly more complex and nuanced than their straightforward and warm personal relation. Luft expresses a similar sentiment: while Fink’s originality introduced urgent challenges to Husserl’s thought, Fink was also a “Trojan horse” who wanted to “… allow inimical ideas to enter the system of Husserlian phenomenology”, which was a danger Husserl was entirely aware of (2011: 166). On Husserl’s part, much of this were inadvertent consequences of working with his ardent, but also highly original research assistant, who, as Hart notes, “… emerged very early as Husserl’s equal in ways that were not always maximally conducive to realizing Husserl’s own personal projects.” (2001: 279). In this regard, Fink’s contributions were instrumental, helping unearth some deep-rooted and difficult meta-issues, themselves in need of phenomenological clarification. While their collaborative efforts started as an attempt to introduce systematicity and methodological uniformity into Husserl’s numerous and diverse analyses, they also exposed phenomenology to a set of new questions and problems. Whether the fact that it took place in the last decade of Husserl’s life imbues their collaborative work with a special kind of testamentary value is an open question however, reasons for its peculiar importance and place within the Husserlian corpus, as well as within the wider context of phenomenology, go well beyond mere statement of historical and biographical fact. Maybe… or maybe we should read into all the little signs that intrigue us.Husserl’s intensive collaboration with Eugen Fink is a particularly apt point of departure for a reading looking to clarify Husserl’s complex notion of ‘humanity’. Maybe we should listen to what this artist is saying- take the advice of the people we love, but not look too much into it. When in reality, he is talking directly about this person.īut he warms them saying, “You are looking too closely.”ĭon’t we all sometimes look too closely at things? Interpret things the exact way we should not? And it gives us this stress and worries and hurt. The light guitar and piano in the background of the beginning really took my breath away.Īlthough I am not sure exactly what this song means, it is obvious he is trying to make the person he is talking about know he isn’t talking about them.
I’ve never heard a song specifically say “This is not for you” and it got to me. I heard this line while sitting on the floor of my dorm room, drinking tea and eating chocolate covered peanut crackers. “This is a song about somebody else, so don’t worry yourself, worry yourself.”
0 kommentar(er)
